The sociology of creativity: PART III: Applications – The socio-cultural contexts of the acceptance/rejection of innovations

2.1Acceptance/incorporation/ institutionalization

As articulated in Part I, “creations” are subject to selective, and institutionalizing environments – which are in large part social, economic, and political but also material and ecological. Key actors in selective environments act in response to an innovator’s creations supporting them or penalizing/obstructing them to varying degrees in the field F and/or in the more encompassing social systems. Thus, many highly innovative creations may not be accepted and institutionalized (e.g. patented) and brought out in a market or other social field or space.

Typically, there are several phases of selection contexts, from the local or immediate selective environment, to eventually more encompassing systems including legal, economic, and political (as suggested in Fig. 2, Part I and Fig. 3B below). Responsive agents configured in networks, groups, organizations in the environment are essential to explaining the success or failure of innovative initiatives, their social acceptance or rejection, respectively.²

Creative action may be blocked through several mechanisms: because of coercive and/or persuasive opposition;³ because of a lack or denial of sufficient resources, necessary knowledge, and actor performance capabilities; or because alternative competing developments may prove more attractive or more effective.

Experts (those recognized as capable of judging) in a “discipline” or field assess and encourage (or discourage) an innovation (evaluating whether “it’s nonsense” or something “useful” or “promising”). In many cases, “experts” (if they are in agreement) can determine whether an innovation is approved, applied, and developed – or ignored and forgotten and unlikely to be accepted and institutionalized. For instance, key people at an organization or in a field may judge their approval and support of an innovative idea, design, technology, or system but the “market” or other institutional contexts do not approve and ignore or reject it. Agents in these larger contexts (political, economic, or cultural) may negate the innovation, although the initiating entrepreneurs, engineers, managers, and other experts more directly involved were all positively in agreement about its value or promise. Or, in the long-run, the natural environment may penalize, block or frustrate the realization and sustainability of the innovation. The context of mechanisms of judgment, acceptance (or rejection), legitimation and institutionalization is typically characterized by other processes than those associated with the innovation/discovery context (see Parts I and II).⁴

In general, there is a politics to creativity, as in the case of most social change in terms of the mobilization of support and acceptance or opposition and suppression [13, 15]. Still, even if initially accepted and brought into social fields including markets, an innovation may fail to gain wider acceptability, or may fail sooner or later in performance, thus joining the tens of thousands of creations that don’t work out (those that never come to fruition or those that have “succeeded” but over time have been confronted with sufficient mobilized opposition to make the innovation non-sustainable).

2.2Illustrations of selection, legitimation and institutionalization of innovative initiatives and creative developments

In many areas of human endeavor, we have suggested that the challenge is not just to produce novelty (there are tens of thousands of novel household appliances, weapons, chemicals, medicines, production techniques, etc. that have been produced in the past 100 years and earlier (see Table 1, Part I). But there have also been major challenges to introducing and gaining their acceptance in relevant areas of application. Advanced societies see themselves as relatively “open” to innovation–arguably more so than many traditional societies; we witness many innovations being introduced, applied and developed – or opposed and rejected. Consideration of Table I (Part I) suggests the cascades of thousands of innovations that we witness around us, indicating that many have been successfully introduced and put to use. But even highly modern societies after years with some innovative technologies or other novelties try to ban or limit the use of some of them: tobacco, amphetamines, chemical and nuclear weapons. Other examples discussed below are DDT, HCFC, and GMOs. A relatively recent innovative complex is nano techniques and their thousands of “useful” applications. A large number of researchers are attempting to ascertain what are their potential negative impacts on human health and the environment. So, the future of nanomaterials – or at least some of them – is in the process of beingascertained.

There have been many creative designs and developments – from technologies to institutional arrangements – which fail to perform properly or to be accepted by key agents. Some such as the EU Baltic Fisheries Regulatory Framework failed almost from the beginning [13]. Other large-scale and initially successful innovations such as the Soviet communist system applied in the Russian Empire, and eventually to Eastern European countries, collapsed in 1989– 1991 in the face of widespread critique and opposition movements. The Soviet type system managed to modernize, to provide modest levels of welfare, health, education, yet not on a level matching many Western countries. And, most importantly, the Soviet Union and its satellites fell behind technologically and militarily in several key areas as well as functioned in ways very contrary to democratic norms and the rule of law [13].

Many technological developments have been stopped, in some cases even after years of successful application. For instance, numerous food additives, a range of chemicals and medicines which at one time had been used “successfully” in applications, were later banned. For example, the refrigerant HCFCs (hydrochlorofluorocarbons) – one form synthesized in the late 1800s was banned in the Montreal protocol 1987, because of its depletion of the ozone layer protecting life on earth from excessive ultraviolet light (ironically, widespread introduction of HCFC in refrigeration was in part the result of its low toxicity for humans compared to other refrigerants such as ammonia). DDT is another example of an initial success story which came under contention and ultimately restriction on its use. Synthesized in 1874 and its powerful insecticide action discovered in 1939, DDT was banned globally at the 2001 Stockholm convention, after a number of countries had banned it and substantial social movements opposed its use (but there were also key movements, especially in developing countries, for its continued use against mosquitoes and other serious disease vectors). The initial ban on DDT’s use in agriculture emerged in response to Rachel Carson’s powerful Silent Spring, which mapped its diverse and disastrous environmental impacts. It continues to be used modestly to control some disease vectors but this remains controversial.

There are thousands of cases of medicines which have been banned because of the discovery – sometimes long after their introduction and extensive use – of their harmful effects. For example, tragically, the effective tranquilizer Thalidomide had to be stopped because it led to malformed fetuses – unfortunately this was only realized after thousands of cases had occurred. The USA’s FDA never released it on the market, avoiding the catastrophe of its use among pregnant women, whereas Germany and Sweden made extensive use of it with tragic consequences.

Not all cases are resolved. The addition of fluoride to drinking water to improve the health of people’s teeth has been very controversial. In Europe it is widely banned, while in the USA, it is used a great deal but banned in certain cities and regions – and controversies and struggles about its use continue, also in Europe. This is also the case with certain vaccines such as those against measles, mumps, and vaginal warts.

3.1The societal context of creativity and innovative development

The introduction and development of an innovation is a socio-historical process (see Fig. 3B). The process of shaping innovations entails in many cases the solution to both technical and economic problems as well as socio-political and cultural problems. The key point here is that often there are multiple, qualitatively different problems which have to be dealt with and solved in order to introduce, develop and institutionalize an innovation. Diverse actors may be recruited and involved in the complex process of trying to introduce and institutionalize an innovation in one or more contexts. In multi-agent processes, important types of actors are not only inventors and entrepreneurs, but production engineers, financial and marketing experts, adventurous consumers and opinion leaders, policy – and law-makers, as well as those involved in social and political movements, which come to influence the normative climate and relevant policy processes in the society.

These diverse actors typically play different roles, command different competencies and power resources, and are often motivated by different values and goals. The inventor(s) has the knowledge and the capability to formulate a new idea or to bring forth, for instance, a novel method or technology. But she often lacks the capital or the skills to bring the idea into effective production. On the other hand, someone building up production may be bad at marketing the products, at influencing the perspectives and practices of potential users, or, in general, at educating them. Educational processes are often carried out through networks of users and potential users as they communicate with one another through, for instance, their own interpersonal or professional network or through the World Wide Web. These diverse actors play out their roles at different but overlapping times in shaping new systems for producing, distributing and using an innovation. A variety of conditions and factors influence the development of such systems, facilitating, retarding and even blocking the introduction of an innovation.

Established industries or sectors have their lobbies as do relevant labor unions and communities dependent on these industries. A potentially promising innovation may have at best a few entrepreneurs looking for new markets. Workers who will ultimately get jobs in a new branch and the communities who will benefit from the implantation of new factories are not yet known (or, at least, not mobilized). They make up no lobbying force – or an embryonic one at best –while the established industries and sectors with their vested interests fight changes and new developments which threaten their livelihood or positions of status and power.

This suggests the strategic importance of policies which consider branch initiatives and developments in relation to those who may be threatened or hurt by the decline of established systems and/or the appearance of new systems. Apart from this, the state, business interests, or a socio-political movement, may have an interest in the development of an innovation and may mobilize the powers essential to push through initial policy and institutional changes that will open up market opportunities (e.g., through reduction of monopolistic or oligopolistic restraints) or other institutional developments such as legal, educational, administrative, or military (the environmental movement played a key role in the early development of wind energy in Denmark [4]; see earlier discussion on the emergence of nuclear power in Sweden).

Government authorities can play a decisive role together with entrepreneurs and firms in facilitating the introduction of innovations and in getting open market developments started. Of course, as pointed out above, at times such actors may play negative roles. There is often an interplay between economics and politics. The politics centers around such issues as comparative price developments, market entry for new producers and distributors as well as R&D funding and subsidies, the extent of monopoly control over production and distribution, and the legal-administrative conditions under which an innovation may be introduced and used, for instance a new pharmaceutical, a new chemical, or a new energy technology (see Part II).⁹ The more social restructuring required because an innovation entails a radical departure from conventional entities and conditions or because powerful vested interests oppose its introduction, then the more politics is required for the introduction and development of the innovation and related systems (see discussion below).¹⁰

Case studies [4, 13, 36] demonstrate that the introduction and diffusion of innovations are subject, in general, to multiple facilitators as well as constraints. The facilitators and barriers are not only technical and economic. They are also socio-political and cultural. Vested interests in existing conditions may be all too powerful and capable of effective constraint. The power and authority of those pushing for innovations, for instance, alternative systems, may be very circumscribed, not only in terms of lobbying strength and the ability to influence policy-making, but also in terms of technical know-how and access to investment and R&D resources, or of influence on education and research policies, as well as the various policies which influence network practices of consumers.

In general, innovations — and the systems in which they become integral parts— may take a variety of paths (there is some path dependency but rarely path determinacy). Which ones will be successful — or which of several forms will be successful— cannot be determined a priori (see footnote 11). This reflects the fact that innovative developments, for instance, the introduction of new technologies into production, distribution and use, entail technical, economic, and sociopolitical problems which “must” be solved as the innovation is introduced in concrete contexts by a constellation of actors. The actors involved often give different priority to the various problems and support diverse solutions. Matters of contradictory assessment and judgement come into play. Alliances and counter-alliances may be formed. Conflicts occur in any case.

The resultant uncertainty must be managed by the entrepreneurial agents, in part simply through taking professional, political, and economic risks, in part by solving technical and economic problems and bringing about changes in government policies and regulations. Such problem-solving entails processes of adaptation, and trial and error, as well as backtracking. Most innovative development is typically not a precisely plannable activity, particularly in its early phases. As Nelson and Langlois [29:815] argue (see Fig. 2 in Part I of this article):¹¹

“ ...   it is an activity characterized as much by false starts, missed opportunities and lucky breaks as by brilliant insights and clever strategic decisions.

Only in hindsight does the right approach seem obvious; before the fact, it is far from clear which of the bewildering array of options will prove fruitful or even feasible.”

Policy and research concerning innovation and new development (including technological development) are often oriented toward “hardware,” the technical aspects, as well as the economic aspects, the assessment of the likely markets and levels of demand. Social science research point up the importance of “social technologies:” organizational forms, rules and norms, policies and attitudes which affect the introduction and development of new systems. This applies to the organization of research and development, to the planning and organization of production and use of an innovation, the education of users, and the various institutional arrangements and policies which facilitate or hinder the introduction and development of innovations and new systems. We have pointed out earlier the significance of particular rule changes. Also, one should stress the importance of communication and collaborative linkages among key actor agents who play different roles in the new development.

Numerous studies suggest that innovative developments, particularly those emerging in consumer markets, are facilitated by institutions and programs which provide for:

The preceding points suggest, on the one hand, the complexity of some innovative developments and, on the other hand, the ability of entrepreneurs and other social agents to solve complex problems in the course of such developments. In part they do this by muddling through! Indeed, muddling through reflects the high uncertainty so characteristic of entirely new developments.

Clearly, an innovation is not developed and applied in the abstract, but in a particular context. It is proposed in relation to certain problems or needs, as a means to solve problems or to meet needs (including that of making a profit) or to express feelings (as in music, song, and dance). The production, distribution and use systems associated with an innovation or family of innovations develop in particular cultural, technical, economic, and socio-political contexts. These shape and regulate the innovation and problem-solving processes (possibly blocking them in some ways, and facilitating their introduction in other ways) at the same time that the developments themselves lead to restructuring of the contexts, for instance, the institutional arrangements and cultural forms that embed continuing processes.

In sum, the production, distribution and use of any innovation should be examined and analyzed in its dynamic societal and relational context. The activities associated with an innovation may to varying degrees fit into the context of established production-distribution-use systems. Typically, when an innovation is of the same general type as an established entity (or entities), its introduction entails no more than a modification or adaptation of the existing systems or of the innovation itself. The uncertainties and risks of introduction are likely to be minimal.

The introduction and development of many innovations typically entails complex problem-solving processes dealing with diverse technical, economic and socio-political problems; uncertainties and risks are high. Inventors, entrepreneurs, technicians, change agents of other types, and even social movements play important roles in creative societal developments and dealing with diverse uncertainties and risks. The transformation of such motive power into the launch and development of innovations and new systems can be planned and regulated only to a very limited extent. In the face of high uncertainty associated with complex technical, commercial and socio-political processes whose ultimate outcomes are not predictable, a direct and dominant government role is likely to be ineffective, even counter-productive. A government possesses no “transcendental truth” or “blue-print for the future:” it cannot “pick winners” or “weed out losers” as we discuss below (also see examples in footnote 11).

Under conditions of high uncertainty, government policy-making for facilitating innovation and creative developments in a field should be directed toward establishing the enabling conditions and incentive structures for inventors, entrepreneurs, and other change agents, including consumer groups, to take initiatives and to act creatively in introducing and developing an innovation. Governments may facilitate research and development as well as information exchange and learning generally. They may act to remove unnecessary barriers to and costs of experimentation and initiative-taking to develop alternative systems. They may encourage, through providing incentives and risk-sharing measures, entrepreneurial, technical and scientific actors to take necessary risks.

A basic problem in much contemporary market mediated innovation is that often the payoffs, returns on investments, market demand, and consumer reactions depend to some extent on government policies and socio-political conditions which entrepreneurs may be in no position to influence, for instance those that could support improvements in research and development, their production methods, improved quality control, rationalization and more effective marketing strategies. Socio-political uncertainty and turbulence increase the risks of investments and initiatives to develop innovations and, thereby, can slow down, distort, or block eventual creative development.

A climate of high socio-political or economic uncertainty makes enterprises and financial intermediaries reluctant to make expensive commitments. The longer it takes to develop, bring into production, and to market an innovation, the less likely enterprises will invest in them, especially in times of great social instability and uncertainty. Exceptions would be most likely in rapidly expanding areas or areas with opportunities for extremely large payoffs to make the risks appear worthwhile. The general tendency is for enterprises, particularly well-established enterprises to devote their R&D budgets and investments to innovations which ‘fit in’ or entail only limited modifications of existing types of entities and systems. In short, this means to pursue a gradual or adaptive path of innovative change rather than revolutionary ones in order to increase the chances of acceptance and institutionalization of innovations. This is unfortunate when there is a major challenge or need for revolutionary development (as in the challenges of climate change and sustainability(see Part II)).

3.2Role of social power(s) in creative action and in receptivity to creativity and innovation

Social power is a critical factor in creative applications and developments for several reasons:

In this way, the rapid expansion of nuclear power was combined with new electricity utilization systems (such as electric heated housing) which supported the quick growth of nuclear electricity generation and led to the stagnation of alternative systems such as municipal controlled and managed co-generation as well as district heating [24] (see earlier discussion on the rise of nuclear power in Sweden).

In general, socio-political barriers to innovation are of two general types: (1) entrenched vested interests with considerable political and economic power are able to block or undermine efforts to introduce an innovation and to establish new, or to reshape old, systems; (2) the introduction and development of new systems require restructuring in multiple domains at the same time that the entrepreneurs and change agents pushing for the new development lack sufficient powers to bring about such extensive multi-domain restructuring.

Some innovations require few changes for their introduction. They can more or less be produced, distributed and used within existing arrangements. Their deployment is likely to be more adaptive or gradual in character. As long as ‘entry-barriers’ or entry costs are low, an entrepreneur has clear opportunities to initiate the development process. (Of course, entry barriers or powerful vested interests against entry may raise initiative and development costs and their risks considerably).

One may distinguish between frontier fields and well-established fields. In the former there are typically fewer or no major vested interests to block or impede the introduction and development of an innovation. On the other hand, in well-organized or institutionalized fields, powerful vested interests may have to be won over or defeated in order to initiate new developments (and the infrastructures of their systems distorting or constraining many new initiatives must be transformed or replaced).¹³ To bring about a major innovation in such established systems, an entrepreneur or change agent needs the backing of, for example, one or more major corporations, powerful labor unions, key industry associations, utilities, and possibly the state itself, a configuration such as that mobilized in the development of nuclear energy in Sweden (and elsewhere). Or, they may require the backing of a political movement or key government agencies to bring about changes in laws, policies, and ordinances suitable for the planned or proposed innovative initiatives and developments (as in Danish wind development).

Much innovation and creative action depends on available powers, capacities, resources including positions, authorities, network contacts for action, and for carrying out creative operations. Particular material resources need to be available or mobilized for many creative actions; this is obvious, for instance, in constructing a resource-demanding built-environment or a large-scale socio-technical system such as nuclear or hydro-power facilities [1]. In general, an individual or collective agent has to have access to tools and resources which are used in particular creative initiatives and innovative developments. Access to such powers and resources may be based on property rights, political or administrative authority or even coercive powers.

For example, in the case of alternative energy technologies, the technical, economic and political influence of the entrepreneurs and change agents engaged in developing the technologies has been, until recently, relatively weak: solar, bio-mass and small-scale wind technologies were not generally backed or driven by powerful enterprises and industries. The environmental, anti-nuclear and related social movements supporting ‘soft and renewable energy sources’ tended to be stronger in vision and imagination than powerful in technical, financial, production and market realms. At the same time, established energy and utility companies such as those in the petroleum and coal industries had (and still have) powerful lobbies and command considerable authority on energy matters in public forums and policymaking domains.

The more an innovation radically departs from conventional patterns and practices, or the more its introduction requires substantial restructuring of existing social systems for production, distribution and use, the more opposition it is likely to generate from vested interests in the established systems, and the greater the level of uncertainty in the acceptance and institutionalization process. Although there may be attempts to redesign and adapt the innovation to enable it to fit more easily into existing arrangements, there are often technical, economic, and socio-political or legal limits to such restructuring. Therefore, the stress may be placed on reshaping the institutional context, practices and ways of thinking associated with established systems. This sets in motion processes of support as well as opposition. The innovative development may take off or may be retarded or blocked as social groups mobilize power resources and play out various roles and strategies vis a vis the development process[5].

Radical innovations typically require the mobilization of powerful agents or a powerful socio-political movement or a coalition to bring about the necessary re-orientation and restructuring, especially in established fields where functioning alternatives are supported by powerful vested interests. This transformation does not only involve the restructuring of a variety of components linked to the effective production and use of the innovations. Nor is it simply a question of structuring sanctions and incentives to allow such innovations to grow and develop through self-reinforcing processes.¹⁴ Obtaining a mandate and legitimation to carry out restructuring is equally as important, if not in some instances more so, than receiving economic and technical support (see the cases of EU REACH regulation of chemicals and EU food regulation presented in Part II).

Consider the case of introducing radically new technologies that require shaping new and different socio-technical systems. One is not simply dealing with a slight variation or adaption of a highly compatible ‘new product’ but a more ‘global innovative complex,’ which will often require social and legal changes that cannot be carried out by technicians or entrepreneurs, but only by political agents and policymakers.¹⁵

Radical innovations, for instance radically new technologies or socio-technical systems, will typically have impacts on different areas of society, not simply production systems, markets, spheres of consumption, but government policy and regulation, education, and research. For this reason the restructuring is usually carried out by — even requires for its success — an alliance of actors engaged across different social spheres and institutions in society. Such a movement carries through and integrates the technical, economic and socio-political problem-solving into more or less coherent production-distribution-utilization (PDU) systems. These are not in the final analysis ad hoc collections of independent components, but systems which are largely shaped in relation to one another, that is, part of a complex network.

Inability to establish such a coalition or network across strategic spheres is likely to result in blockage of or major impediments to new developments. In general, such blockage is more likely if:

In any concrete historical situation, these conditions are not fixed. Social learning, coalition formation, resource mobilization, commitments and strategies undergo change. Thus, any adequate theory and strategy of the innovation-in-production-and-use will be formulated taking into consideration time. Change agents continually reassess the situation and re-commit themselves to bringing about the necessary economic, socio-political, and institutional changes. Additional resources, including expert resources, may be mobilized to effectively overcome vested interests in the established system(s) and their opposition to the innovation in question.

To sum up: the change agents who are necessary to bring about a radically new development will vary substantially from case to case, depending on the degree and type of ‘incompatibility’ between the innovation and established production, distribution and use systems and their particular vested interests and powers (see Table 3).¹⁶

Radical changes call for powerful collective actors or coalitions which can initiate and carry through the necessary changes in different fields and sectors, in part by mobilizing social power and strategic resources. In obvious national emergencies there may be normative pressures and social movements enabling the integration of different interests and the mobilization of resources across institutions and fields of social activity. This has been, in our view, a critical factor in the wartime and national emergency successes of some nation-states in radically re-orienting production and establishing new, sometimes revolutionary systems not only in the military field, but also in education, R&D fields, and government. There are cascades of creativity under such conditions.

In sum, the costs, economic and socio-political, tend to be greater the more radical and extensive the changes entailed in trying to introduce and develop an innovation. The uncertainties and risks for entrepreneurs, investors, and possibly political leaders are correspondingly greater. The development of radical innovations requires then multiple changes, problem-solving, learning and social restructuring; shaping possibly new enterprises and organizations, new markets and market networks; establishing new public policies and laws, and the mobilization and exercise of economic as well as socio-political power. The changes which must be realized in order to introduce and develop a radical creation in production, distribution and use are realized or carried out by entrepreneurial social agents and also possibly involving their alliances. They must have access to or mobilize sufficient authority, economic resources, and political power to do this, particularly in instances where powerful social agents with vested and ideological interests oppose them. A major problem in new developments is that often the actors who have the necessary knowledge, commitments and the will to shape something new may lack the resources and social power to realize this ambition. The problem is particularly critical when changes must be carried out in several spheres of social production in order to establish effective production, distribution and use systems (see Table 1). Entrepreneurs may be able to attract finance capital and to establish production of an innovation but lack the political skills or capabilities to initiate changes in relevant government policies and regulations, which would assure the innovation’s legitimacy and effective realization. Conversely, socio-political actors may bring about change in laws and government policies in order to encourage or facilitate particular innovations but fail to influence business leaders and enterprises to invest in relevant new businesses and sector developments based on a new family of innovations such as GMOs or nanomaterials; at the same time, the political agents lack the knowledge, control over resources, or legitimacy to initiate business activity themselves.

In general, one may distinguish between, on the one hand, radical and, on the other hand, adaptive/incremental innovation and system development (see Table 1) [11, 24]. Lonnroth remarks [24:33]:¹⁷

Lonnroth [24:33] refers to the metaphor of “the critical path,” where the incremental innovation or limited gradual development has a critical path of expansion under conditions that are mainly internal to, and are handled within, a given industry or sector, while the more revolutionary innovations are subject to a critical path where the conditions necessary for successful initiation and expansion cannot be met by the sector alone but requires multiple sectors and possibly extensive government and even public involvement.

Of course, if an innovation is the ‘brain-child’ of large, powerful enterprises, they often have the economic and political power to mobilize and assure sufficient financing and political support across sectors. In some cases, large companies, engineering and professional groups and academic professions join forces with supporters in the government – such a configuration played a role in most instances in the development of nuclear power in many countries (the military were often also an important participating agent).

In other instances, private enterprises — particularly smaller and medium sized ones — cannot mobilize the resources and put together the political coalition necessary to shape and introduce major radical innovations – except possibly in a completely new, open field (with, for instance, open market opportunities) which lacks large or powerful institutionalized agents and, therefore, provides opportunities for small and medium-sized enterprises to take unencumbered creative initiatives. However, for some demanding projects – regardless of the competitive context – the initiators may lack the resources, technical capability and expertise necessary to launch and establish a new development.

The more restructuring of the field (or fields) required, the greater the power resources necessary to assure that technical production, marketing, and legal-political problems can be dealt with, and uncertainty reduced or largely eliminated. The challenge may not be simply one of building think-tanks and individual production plants but establishing new social systems, training new cadres of specialists, settling issues concerning environmental and health standards, deciding land use or other resource policy questions. In sum, the uncertainties which slow down or block innovative developments may arise for diverse reasons: lack of necessary resources and technologies, technical and scientific problems, ignorance about potential users and about market demand, uncertainty about ownership and patent rights, instability or inconsistency in government policies, uncertainty about socio-political movements and political developments that could play a role in the successful introduction of the innovation and the shaping of systems based on it.

3.3Public power: Government involvement in innovative developments — Its uses and abuses

As stressed above, major innovative developments entail to a greater or lesser extent the mobilization and exercise of social power(s). In many instances, such power is mobilized by business leaders, possibly political leaders, government agencies as well as other political actors including NGOs in order to support, reorient, or to possibly block new developments. Understanding innovation and new development requires a conceptualization of the ambiguous role of governments, and political agents generally [36].

The policies, strategies, and programs of governments and political agents may be important for facilitating new developments by funding R&D, changing laws, regulations, codes of standards, and, in general, providing resources to and supporting new sector developments and employment opportunities.

At the same time, the power of governments or political agents generally may interfere with and disorient learning and innovation processes essential to new developments. With the best of intentions, they may try to “choose winners,” deciding on a direction of development which leads prematurely to the reduction of variety (but also of uncertainty), locking the development into non-optimal or even dead-end paths [29]. In some instances, opponents to certain new developments manage to win the support of the state to block important innovations, as we have pointed out earlier in the case of powerful public utilities and energy-intensive industries in Sweden blocking alternatives-to-nuclear developments (including such innovations as district heating and municipal co-generation) [37].

What general conclusion can be reached about the limitations on and possibilities of government actors to advance or to hinder new developments? First, government agencies and policy-makers may become involved in processes of innovation and sector development as a result of their own interests as well as pressures from supporters or opponents of the innovation. Secondly, the forms of involvement, the possible roles and programs, and the dilemmas and risks of involvement may provide a frame for specifying and assessing the utility of government involvement in; new developments. Two critical dimensions here are (i) the complex phases of development (each associated with different types and degrees of uncertainty: technical, economic, legal, social, and political) (see phase model in Part I) (ii) the government’s ultimate role (utilization and/or regulation) in the field(s)’ eventual development. Our argument is straight-forward and can be expressed in terms of three principles.

Principle 1. The earlier the phase of development, and the greater the technical, economic, and socio-political uncertainties, the less the government should be involved in any direct or selective way (except concerning legal requirements and constraints on health and environmental risks). In many instances, there are available entrepreneurs and change agents willing and capable of carrying through the development process, provided they are left to themselves with sufficient resources. At most, they might require government assistance in breaking down some of the legal, administrative and policy constraints and in overcoming monopolistic and other blockages maintained by opposing vested interests in conventional systems.

In general, governments lack knowledge to make the appropriate assessments and to solve the many scientific, technical, production, and commercial problems which are involved initially in the innovation processes and in the ultimate establishment of successful production-distribution-use systems.

Numerous studies suggest that in order to be effective, public policymaking should intervene in a substantial way only in sectors where technical or creative uncertainty has been eliminated, that is, when it is only a question of choosing between variants that are perfectly well known and their evolution foreseeable.

The state can reduce some of the risks and thereby facilitate exploration of new, promising paths of development. It can encourage processes of research and invention, facilitate contacts and communication among key groups of technicians and designers, managers, marketing experts, and users and potential users. Such a “supportive” and more indirect role is discussed more fully below.

Principle 2. The greater the degree of technical, commercial, and socio-political uncertainty in the development process, the less the state (or its agencies) should be directly or intimately involved in the process. It typically lacks the technical, economic or socio-political knowledge and judgement capability to engage in the complex assessment and sorting-out processes. In particular, it lacks in most instances the technical and economic knowledge to enable it to foresee or plan which technologies or technological developments will pay off and which will result in “flops” and “deadends.” Its role in such development processes should be limited to providing resources to R&D, facilitating information exchange and learning, and removing unnecessary barriers to or cost burdens on alternative developments (for instance, blocking a monopolization or dissolving monopoly structures to enable competition to drive innovation (that is, not just price optimization). Its policies, incentives, and subsidies should encourage scientific, technical, and commercial actors to experiment and to take calculated risks.

Principle 3. The less the government is to be ultimately involved in the use or consumption of new innovations or developments which will be introduced and developed, the more strictly the government should avoid being directly or intimately involved in the specific design of the innovation and the development of production, marketing, and educational processes associated with it. Conversely, it is appropriate and essential that the government is involved in the planning and the management of systems in which it is already playing a major role as producer and/or consumer or in which it will play such roles as in the cases of military equipment, administrative and security systems, provision of welfare services, governance and regulation, and related processes. That is, in these cases it has concrete and specific interests in, and ultimate use of, the innovation for its own activities. In some instances the government is already involved for historical reasons in a system that is in the process of transformation. In other cases, the state may become involved because it is the only actor who can provide the financing and manage the research process. In many countries, nuclear energy development has been such a case.¹⁸

A meta-management role for the state – found in cells (1), (2), and (3) in Table 2— can be distinguished from direct and intimate involvement in complex technical, commercial and socio-political decision processes whose outcomes are not predictable (see [4] and [5] in Table 2).

Below we discuss briefly three general role engagements and related strategies for government action (see Table 2). Finer distinctions can also be made as the specific technical, economic and socio-political contexts are specified.

3.4Creative success and failure: A systemic, multi-dimensional perspective

Success of innovation initiatives are a function of multiple factors, a number of which have been identified in this article (see Parts I and II). At the same time, failures of initiatives may depend on one or a few factors. Many creative initiatives are initiated, and many of them fail. As we have suggested with some of our illustrations, some may succeed initially, and then fail later after participants or observers accumulate experience— or the validation and power context and/or judgment frame shifts. Also, creations ignored or blocked in one context or historical period may be rediscovered or revived at a later time.

As indicated earlier, the likelihood of a creative production in a field depends on the objective or purpose of the production and the innovator’s ability to mobilize and to put together the essential ingredients of people and resources in the creativity production processes. Successful innovation and development is likely to be accomplished when an agent or agents is able to formulate essential ideas or designs and carry out production functions integrating necessary input resources and people. This involves (see Part II):

These and related factors identified and discussed here relate to the likelihood of producing a successful innovation. But, as we have stressed in our models, generation of an innovation is necessary but not sufficient for an innovation’s acceptance and utilization in social life, for instance in a market (for a general consideration of the concept of emergence, see Buckley [7]). Social mechanisms of acceptance and institutionalization are also an essential part of the ultimate success of a novelty or creation (see Figures 3B and 4).

An innovation is likely to be accepted and incorporated/institutionalized in field F when:

The life cycle of an innovation is not limited to the acceptance/non-acceptance dichotomization, at least not in an historical or evolutionary perspective. Even successful, highly institutionalized creations may be ultimately phased out or substantially constrained, as illustrated in several of our cases— for example, nuclear energy, an EU energy tax, and GMOs [15]. Opposition emerges among scientists, in the mass media and within the larger publics, and play a critical role in the constraint on, or blocking of, some creative developments. For instance, nuclear energy construction has been blocked or stalled in a number of countries. Similarly, there has been more or less blockage of GMO development in the EU. On the other hand, blocked or defunct reations may be revived or re-discovered. The latter provide numerous examples:

We have stressed that an agent may succeed in innovating, even radically, but that the context of acceptance and institutionalization of the innovation is in large part decisive in its ultimate success or failure. The distinction between the two contexts, that of creativity and that of social receptivity, is a matter of degree (see [16] concerning the links between the two contexts). Often the contexts are closely linked (as in many groups and companies that are producing innovation for themselves). In a highly democratic society with developed public opinion and widespread capacities to mobilize people to support or oppose a creative initiative, public receptivity is a critical variable in any consideration of innovation and creative development.

3.5Likelihood patterns in the context of acceptance and legitimization processes

Table 3 provides a simple scheme of likelihood patterns of acceptance and rejection of innovation. The Table indicates, for instance, patterns of likely acceptance and institutionalization as a function of the compatibility between the innovation and the context where it is to be introduced and established, the extent to which the innovation challenges or threatens key agents of power and status, or the extent to which the initiators have superior or countervailing power.

From our earlier examples and discussions in Parts I and II, failure of a particular innovative initiative is not only then a question of non-available or scarce resources and technologies (“the need for a more funding”) or the limited knowledge, capabilities, and social relations of the agents involved (“the need for greater expertise and entrepreneurship,” or the “need for a more creative social interaction or climate”), but depends also on oppositional and political forces generated within institutional, network, and other relevant power contexts.

Agential factors may constrain or block innovative initiatives and developments— for instance, key actors are in a position to decide over the mobilization and allocation/deployment of crucial resources. They may do this because they are culturally/normatively narrow, or unimaginative, or because they have vested interests in existing systems and are opposed to change— and have the means to block innovative initiatives or their implementation. In a word, there may be a major gap between those who have power, on the one hand, and those who have creative ideas and innovative project proposals, on the other hand. One of the drivers of agents seeking and utilizing social power is to be able to develop and try to launch their creative projects— or, on the other hand, to be able to block creative initiatives and developments of others. Power is the common denominator.

In sum, our multi-factor model of creativity implies that innovative initiatives may fail because of one or more factors in the matrix of relevant factors.

Indeed, there are arguably more failures than successes in innovative projects [27]; although through repeated efforts, and learning from one’s mistakes or the mistakes of others, eventual success may be accomplished, as the cases of Edison and his incandescent light bulb and the Wright brothers and their flying machines illustrate (see Part II). An initiative is likely to be unsuccessful, particularly if it is complex and revolutionary, where (i) the idea of the innovation – its functions, performance or appearance characteristics – is poorly defined; or the idea is misleading or a misfit with natural laws and conditions (e.g., laws of electricity, magnetism, and gravitation) (ii) there are deficiencies in quantities or qualities of inputs whether material resources or deficiencies in the producers and experts (including weakness in motivation and self-confidence) (iv) the entity, its appearance and other features as well as its functioning (and performance including cost properties, reliability, compatibility with other systems) evoke opposition and rejection due to major norms, institutional arrangements, and powerful agents;¹⁹ (v) there are internal incompatibilities and lack of correspondences among inputs, between production modalities and inputs, or between the outputs and the context; subsystems or subcomponents do not correspond or interface properly with one another.

Thus, because of any one of a number of factors, failures of innovative initiatives are many, whether the innovation agent is an individual, a well-situated network, an informal or formal group, or complex social system such as an entire society. Examples are numerous.

As several cases of failure indicate, agents initiating innovative attempts may have capabilities and skills, essential resources, excellent organization but the idea or design was faulty or public opposition and institutional barriers prevented realization of the innovation in practice.