

Erratum

Asset and reporting policies in the supplemental nutrition assistance program

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The results shown in Table 5 suggest that some policy variants do operate in distinct ways while others do not. Looking first at the estimates of asset policy effects in Columns 1 and 3, we find no evidence that excluding some household vehicles from the asset test operated differently than a policy of excluding all vehicles. Column 1 shows again a substantively small and insignificant effect of vehicle policies on the overall caseload, while Column 3 shows policy estimates that are nearly identical in size (9.4 and 9.8 percent) but that are less precisely estimated than in Table 4. Narrower participation-based and broader information-based expansions of categorical eligibility do appear to operate differently: the estimates suggest that the overall caseload rises by an insignificant 1.0 percent in the wake of the introduction of a participation-based expansion of categorical eligibility, but a significant 6.3 percent after an information-based expansion. Mabli, Martin and Castner [24] obtain a similar result when they distinguish among the two variants of this policy. Estimates of the effects of these two variants of categorical eligibility on the no cash caseload are both insignificant in Column 3.

Turning to the estimates of the effects of reporting policies in Table 5, we find no statistically significant effect of simplified reporting or expanded simplified reporting in Columns 1 and 3, and we continue to find a positive, now marginally significant effect of quarterly reporting on the no cash caseload (Column 3). Monthly reporting does not affect the caseload.

In Columns 2 and 4 of Table 5 we drop short certification periods from the models as a sensitivity check on these estimates of reporting policies. Recall that a substantial number of states lengthened certification periods at about the time that

they adopted simplified reporting, while others used short certification periods rarely even before their introduction of simplified reporting. The estimates of the effects of simplified reporting on the overall caseload (Column 2) are sensitive to the inclusion of certification periods in the model, while the estimates shown in Column 4 for the no cash caseload are not. Specifically, the overall caseload rises by a significant 5.2 percent in the wake of starting up simplified reporting, and by a marginally significant 5.0 percent after introducing expanded simplified reporting. However, an F-test does not reject equality of the four reporting policy estimates ($p = 0.50$), suggesting that the variants of reporting policies do not operate differently.