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SIS evolutionary game model and multi-agent simulation of an infectious disease emergency

Issue title: Papers from the 3rd International Conference on Biomedical Engineering and Technology (iCBEB 2014), 25–28 September 2014, Beijing, China

Subtitle:

Guest editors: Edward J. Ciaccio

Article type: Research Article

Authors: Yang, Fana | Yang, Qinga; * | Liu, Xingxinga | Wang, Panb

Affiliations: [a] School of Management, Wuhan University of Technology, Wuhan, Hubei, China | [b] School of Automation, Wuhan University of Technology, Wuhan, Hubei, China

Correspondence: [*] Corresponding author: Qing Yang, School of Management, Wuhan University of Technology, Wuhan, Hubei, China. E-mail:[email protected]

Keywords: SIS evolution, evolutionarily stable strategy, evolution game, replicator dynamics equations, cellular automata, multi-agent simulation

DOI: 10.3233/THC-150999

Journal: Technology and Health Care, vol. 23, no. s2, pp. S603-S613, 2015

Published: 2015
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Abstract

BACKGROUND: Susceptible-Infected-Susceptible (SIS) infectious disease outbreaks are hazardous events. However, if governments sectors do not adequately supervise such outbreaks, these infectious diseases could spread significantly, resulting in large economic losses and social issues.

OBJECTIVE: In this paper, an evolutionary game and simulation model based on the interactions between strategies and states was proposed, and the game between the public and government sectors and its impact on epidemic situations was discussed.

METHODS: Replicator dynamics equations and the multi-agent model simulation were used for analysis.

RESULTS: According to replicator dynamics equations as well as the multi-agent model simulation, the public all eventually adopted the mobility strategy. In addition, the supervision strength of the governmental sectors was equal to 0 after the strength fluctuated at a low level under the trigger strategy. Ultimately, the entire public shifted to the S state throughout the course of the emergency.

CONCLUSIONS: Social order was maintained and social loss was controlled to a certain extent in the final analysis.

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