Affiliations: [a] Business School, Huaqiao University, Quanzhou, China
| [b] Business School, Xiamen Institute of Technology, Xiamen, China
Correspondence:
[*]
Corresponding author. Shuanping Gao, Business School, Xiamen Institute of Technology, Xiamen, China. Tel.: 13520773761; E-mail: [email protected].
Note: [1] National Natural Science Foundation of China by Grant (Nos. 71571074).
Abstract: The shared supply chain model has provided new ideas for solving contradictions between supply and demand for large-scale standardized production by manufacturers and personalized demands of consumers. On the basis of a platform network effect perspective, this study constructs an evolutionary game model of value co-creation behavior for a shared supply chain platform and manufacturers, analyzes their evolutionary stable strategies, and uses numerical simulation analysis to further verify the model. The results revealed that the boundary condition for manufacturers to participate in value co-creation on a shared supply chain platform is that the net production cost of the manufacturers’ participation in the platform value co-creation must be less than that of nonparticipation. In addition, the boundary condition for the shared supply chain platform to actively participate in value co-creation is that the cost of the shared supply chain platform for active participation in value co-creation must be less than that of passive participation. Moreover, value co-creation behavior on the shared supply chain platform is a dynamic game interaction process between players with different benefit perceptions. Finally, the costs and benefits generated by the network effect can affect value co-creation on shared supply chain platforms.
