The supreme-core on multicriteria fuzzy games

Article type: Research Article

Authors: Chen, Kelvin H.-C.^{a; *} | Wei, Hui-Chuan^b | Li, Ai-Tzu^b | Wang, Wei-Ni^b | Liao, Yu-Hsien^{c; 1}

Affiliations: [a] Department of Applied Chemistry, National Pingtung University, Pingtung, Taiwan | [b] Department of Adult and Continuing Education, National Chung Cheng University, Taiwan | [c] Department of Applied Mathematics, National Pingtung University, Pingtung, Taiwan

Correspondence: [*] Corresponding author. Kelvin H.-C. Chen, Department of Applied Chemistry, National Pingtung University, Pingtung 900, Taiwan. E-mail: E-mail: [email protected].

Note: [1] Co-corresponding author: E-mail: [email protected].

Abstract: By considering the supreme-utilities among fuzzy action vectors, we adopt several sensible inequality constraints to propose a different generalization of the core on multicriteria fuzzy transferable-utility (TU) games. We also adopt the duality results of linear programming theory to analyze the non-emptiness for this extended core under inequality constraints. Further, we define an extended reduction to characterize this extended core. Based on the notion of domination among fuzzy payoff vectors, some coincidences are investigated.

Keywords: Multicriteria fuzzy TU games, the core, supreme-utilities, inequality constraint, domination

DOI: 10.3233/JIFS-18811

Journal: Journal of Intelligent & Fuzzy Systems, vol. 38, no. 2, pp. 1753-1760, 2020