Affiliations: [a]
China Research Center for Emergency Management, Wuhan University of Technology, Wuhan, China
| [b]
Hubei Collaborative Innovation Center for Early Warning and Emergency Response Technology, Wuhan, China
Abstract: In order to improve the quality of food safety information disclosure in traceability system, the study of the influence of related factors on their internal relations in the process of information disclosure was carried out. First, a model of food safety information disclosure between food enterprises and government regulators was built based on the theory of evolutionary game. And then, the route of model evolution was intelligent simulated by Matlab, and different key parameters was adjusted individually to lead the evolution to an ideal condition. The result shows that the problem of false food safety information cannot be solved effectively only relying on government supervision. The power of societal supervision is necessary to clear the market of false food safety information. The combination of the increase in governmental penalty, lowering of governmental supervision cost, improvement of societal supervisory strength, and increase the societal losses of the enterprises due to false food safety information, will effectively result in a quality increase of food safety information published by enterprises, and paves its way for the formation and perfection of an ideal food traceability system.
Keywords: Food safety, information disclosure, government regulation, societal
supervision, evolutionary game
