Strand spaces: proving security protocols correct

Article type: Research Article

Authors: Thayer Fábrega, F. Javier | Herzog, Jonathan C. | Guttman, Joshua D.^{; *}

Affiliations: The MITRE Corporation, 202 Burlington Rd., MS A150, Bedford, MA 01730, USA. E-mail: [email protected], [email protected], [email protected]

Correspondence: [*] Corresponding author.

Abstract: A strand is a sequence of events; it represents either an execution by a legitimate party in a security protocol or else a sequence of actions by a penetrator. A strand space is a collection of strands, equipped with a graph structure generated by causal interaction. In this framework, protocol correctness claims may be expressed in terms of the connections between strands of different kinds. Preparing for a first example, the Needham–Schroeder–Lowe protocol, we prove a lemma that gives a bound on the abilities of the penetrator in any protocol. Our analysis of the example gives a detailed view of the conditions under which it achieves authentication and protects the secrecy of the values exchanged. We also use our proof methods to explain why the original Needham–Schroeder protocol fails. Before turning to a second example, we introduce ideals as a method to prove additional bounds on the abilities of the penetrator. We can then prove a number of correctness properties of the Otway–Rees protocol, and we clarify its limitations. We believe that our approach is distinguished from other work by the simplicity of the model, the precision of the results it produces, and the ease of developing intelligible and reliable proofs even without automated support.

DOI: 10.3233/JCS-1999-72-304

Journal: Journal of Computer Security, vol. 7, no. 2-3, pp. 191-230, 1999