Affiliations: [a] Faculty of Management and Economics, Kunming University of Science and Technology, Kunming, Yunnan, China | [b] Faculty of Economics and Management, Yunnan Agricultural University, Kunming, Yunnan, China
Note: [4] In fact, Fig. 4 could be used to explain why both I and I-A are increasing in e. And the relaxation of the IR constraint maps directly into both outcomes.
Abstract: In recent years, the systematic use of advanced mathematical methods to express, study and argue economic theories has become an important branch and research hotspot in economics. The choice of debt maturity structure is an interesting economics issue in corporate finance. The signing of debt financing contract is not only the enterprises’ independent behavior, but also will be affected by the contract environment. Differences in the contractual environment will inevitably lead to differences in the efficiency of contract enforcement between borrowers and lenders in debt contracts. This paper introduces the contract enforcement efficiency factor on the basis of the standard structure model constructed by Holmstrom and Tirole, and then theoretically investigates the influence mechanism of contract enforcement efficiency on debt maturity structure based on the mediating role of contract enforcement efficiency on the investors’ liquidation claims. By transforming the financing contract into a linear programming problem, and then solving the optimization model, mathematical derivation and static comparative analysis, the research shows that as the efficiency of contract enforcement increases, the amount of short-term debt and long-term debt increases, while the direction change in debt maturity structure is uncertain and the specific relationship between them is closely related to the magnitude of all exogenous variables.
Keywords: Contract enforcement efficiency, debt maturity structure, claims on liquidation value
