A note on the regulation of executive compensation within the 2009 US (Bailout)

Article type: Research Article

Authors: Haidar, Jamal Ibrahim

Note: [] The findings and conclusions of the paper are entirely those of the author and should not be attributed to the World Bank, its affiliated organizations or to members of its Board of Executive Directors or the countries they represent. The World Bank 1818 H Street, NW Washington, DC 20433. Tel: 1-202-473-3219. Fax: 1-202-473-5758. E-mail: [email protected]

Abstract: This paper discusses the design and analyses the potential benefits and costs of executive pay package policy within the US 2009 Emergency Economic Stabilization Act (EESA), commonly known ‘Bailout’. It shows that the ultimate effect of the EESA on executive compensation is generally difficult to predict. Moreover, this paper differentiates between executive pay packages pre- and post-EESA policies.

DOI: 10.3233/IJR-120089

Journal: International Journal of Regulation and Governance, vol. 9, no. 2, pp. 147-156, 2009