Affiliations: LIRNE.NET, Economics of Infrastructures Section, Faculty of Technology, Policy, and Management, Delft University of Technology, Jaffalaan, The Netherlands
Abstract: Telecom infrastructure is assigned a special position in policy because of its important role in the everyday functioning of society. In addition to the direct effects of loss of service, telecom failures cripple coordination capabilities, hindering rescue and recovery operations. Effective disaster-preparedness and recovery is a socio-political objective that any government must attend to. In the case of government- or private-monopoly provision, the government may issue general directives to the management, directly intervene in management functions under ‘emergency’ conditions, and assume all or the bulk of disaster recovery costs. In the ‘new’ order of private provision of telecom services, a different response is required. Disaster-preparedness and recovery by private operators cannot be ensured through licenses or concessions alone. The impossibility of making long-term contracts that address all contingencies applies with amplified force to disaster-related provisions. Therefore, independent regulatory agencies are a part of the solution. This paper addresses the theory and practice of regulatory intervention in disaster-preparedness and recovery drawing from a pilot study conducted by the Telecom Regulatory Commission of Sri Lanka with the support of ICO Global Communications in 1998/99. The elements of effective design of appropriate legislative and license provisions are discussed. Issues of cost containment of disaster-preparedness and recovery measures and the allocation of responsibilities and risks are delineated and the benefits of competitive markets and new technologies for effective use of telecommunications in disaster management are identified.