Affiliations: [a] University of Utrecht, Utrecht School of Governance,
Bijlhouwerstraat 6, NL3511ZC Utrecht, The Netherlands | [b] Erasmus University Rotterdam, Faculty of Social
Sciences, PO Box 1738, NL3000DR Rotterdam, The Netherlands
Abstract: Enforcement agencies increasingly use disclosure as a regulatory
instrument to promote compliance and govern societal risks: data about
companies are disclosed to expose their level of compliance. This innovative
instrument, called the 'pillory', differs from traditional instruments such as
financial incentives ('the carrot'), legal sanctions ('the stick') and
government communication ('the sermon'). The 'pillory' aims to inform and
activate the stakeholder environments of companies and, in so doing, encourage
them to push for better compliance. Based on case studies of the National
Veterinary and Food Administration, the British Environment Agency and the
Dutch Provincial Environmental Inspectorate, this article attempts to determine
the conditions under which Internet-mediated disclosure contributes to the
moderation of societal risks. It is concluded that inspectees (businesses,
supervised organizations) are sensitive to reputational damage even though they
are seldom confronted with the visible actions of stakeholders. Disclosure
affects the behavior of 'small offenders', who care about their reputations,
more than that of 'large offenders', who only react to harsh measures. The
'pillory' is a useful instrument, even though serious offenders still need to
be punished with 'the stick'. In the reflection, we argue that the rise of this
innovative regulatory instrument can be attributed to the availability of
technology and the changing role of government in a network society.
Keywords: Regulation, inspection, disclosure, compliance, transparency, governance of risk
