Affiliations: [a] Department of Computer Science, Loughborough University, Loughborough, LE11 3TU, UK | [b] Department of Computer Science, University of Liverpool, Liverpool L69 3BX, UK | [c] School of Electronics and Computer Science, University of Southampton, Southampton SO17 1BJ, UK | [x] University of Wollongong, Wollongong, NSW 2522, Australia | [y] Nagoya Institute of Technology, Gokiso, Showa, Nagoya 466-8555, Japan
Abstract: This paper analyzes sequential auctions for budget constrained bidders, for multiple heterogeneous common value objects. In most auctions, bidders not only have valuations for objects but also have budget constraints (i.e., constraints on how much they can actually spend in an auction). Given these constraints, the bidders' problem is to determine how much to bid in each auction. To this end, this paper analyzes the strategic behavior of bidders and determines the equilibrium bidding strategies for the individual auctions that constitute a series. We do this in an incomplete information setting where the bidders are uncertain about their budget constraints, and obtain equilibrium bidding strategies for the participants in individual auctions in a series.
