Evolutionary strategies of consumer federation and manufacturer under recall mechanism

Article type: Research Article

Authors: Wang, Chuanxu^a | Song, Changqun^a | Xu, Lang^{b; *}

Affiliations: [a] School of Economics and Management, Shanghai Maritime University, Shanghai China | [b] College of Transport and Communications, Shanghai Maritime University, Shanghai China

Correspondence: [*] Corresponding author. Lang Xu, E-mail: [email protected].

Abstract: Based on an unqualified product recalling process in a supply chain, this paper establishes an evolutionary game model between consumer federation and manufacturer, as well as analyzes the effects of manufacturer’s pricing strategy and consumer federation’s supervision on the decision-making and dynamic tendency. Under this structure, the manufacturers’ pricing strategies on recalls mechanism have two scenarios: the high penalty and low penalty from consumer federation. Results shows that, when the consumer federation adopts high penalty measures, there will be an ESS for consumer federation that can both minimize the cost and protect consumers’ rights. Further, the probability of manufacturer adopting “recall” strategy is positively correlated with the change in the product price, and both the probability of consumer federation adopting “regulate” strategy and manufacturer adopting “recall” strategy are positively correlated with the penalty coefficient.

Keywords: Recall mechanism, evolutionary game, behavior strategy, consumer federation

DOI: 10.3233/JIFS-200086

Journal: Journal of Intelligent & Fuzzy Systems, vol. 41, no. 1, pp. 2403-2415, 2021