Affiliations: [a] Université Catholique de Louvain, Louvain-la-Neuve, Belgium | [b] TUBITAK UEKAE, Gebze, Kocaeli, Turkey | [c] Institute of Science and Technology, Istanbul Technical University, Istanbul, Turkey | [d] Sabanci University, Istanbul, Turkey | [e] Université de Lyon, INRIA, INSA-Lyon, CITI, Lyon, France
Correspondence:
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Corresponding author.
Abstract: Many distance bounding protocols appropriate for the RFID technology have been proposed recently. Unfortunately, they are commonly designed without any formal approach, which leads to inaccurate analyzes and unfair comparisons. Motivated by this need, we introduce a unified framework that aims to improve analysis and design of distance bounding protocols. Our framework includes a thorough terminology about the frauds, adversary and prover, thus disambiguating many misleading terms. It also explores the adversary's capabilities and strategies, and addresses the impact of the prover's ability to tamper with his device. It thus introduces some new concepts in the distance bounding domain as the black-box and white-box models, and the relation between the frauds with respect to these models. The relevancy and impact of the framework is finally demonstrated on a study case: Munilla–Peinado distance bounding protocol.
