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Article type: Research Article
Authors: Chen, Youa | Ding, Ninga; b; * | Gu, Dawua; b; ** | Bian, Yangc
Affiliations: [a] School of Electronic Information and Electrical Engineering, Shanghai Jiao Tong University, Shanghai, China | [b] Shanghai Jiao Tong University (Wuxi) Blockchain Advanced Research Center, China | [c] Fudata Technology, Shanghai, China
Correspondence: [*] Corresponding author. E-mail: [email protected].
Correspondence: [**] Corresponding author. E-mail: [email protected].
Note: [1] An extended abstract of this paper was published in the 18th International Conference on Information Security and Cryptology, Inscrypt 2022 (LNCS, volume 13837). This is the full version.
Abstract: Private set intersection cardinality (PSI-CA) and private intersection-sum with cardinality (PSI-CA-sum) are two primitives that enable data owners to learn the intersection cardinality of their data sets, with the difference that PSI-CA-sum additionally outputs the sum of the associated integer values of all the data that belongs to the intersection (i.e., intersection-sum). However, to the best of our knowledge, all existing multi-party PSI-CA (MPSI-CA) protocols are either limited by high computational cost or face security challenges under arbitrary collusion. As for multi-party PSI-CA-sum (MPSI-CA-sum), there is even no formalization for this notion at present, not to mention secure constructions for it. In this paper, we first present an efficient MPSI-CA protocol with two non-colluding parties. This protocol significantly decreases the number of parties involved in expensive interactive procedures, leading to a significant enhancement in runtime efficiency. Our numeric results demonstrate that the running time of this protocol is merely one-quarter of the time required by our proposed MPSI-CA protocol that is secure against arbitrary collusion. Therefore, in scenarios where performance is a priority, this protocol stands out as an excellent choice. Second, we successfully construct the first MPSI-CA protocol that achieves simultaneous practicality and security against arbitrary collusion. Additionally, we also conduct implementation to verify its practicality (while the previous results under arbitrary collusion only present theoretical analysis of performance, lacking real implementation). Numeric results show that by shifting the costly operations to an offline phase, the online computation can be completed in just 12.805 seconds, even in the dishonest majority setting, where 15 parties each hold a set of size 216. Third, we formalize the concept of MPSI-CA-sum and present the first realization that ensures simultaneous practicality and security against arbitrary collusion. The computational complexity of this protocol is roughly twice that of our MPSI-CA protocol. Besides the main results, we introduce the concepts and efficient constructions of two novel building blocks: multi-party secret-shared shuffle and multi-party oblivious zero-sum check, which may be of independent interest.
Keywords: Multi-party PSI-CA, multi-party PSI-CA-sum, secure multi-party computation, privacy
DOI: 10.3233/JCS-230091
Journal: Journal of Computer Security, vol. Pre-press, no. Pre-press, pp. 1-41, 2024
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