Affiliations: [a] AT&T Labs – Research, 180 Park Avenue, Florham Park, NJ 07932, USA. E-mail: [email protected] | [b] SRI International, 333 Ravenswood Ave, Menlo Park, CA 94025, USA. E-mail: [email protected], [email protected]
Correspondence:
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Corresponding author.
Note: [1] A preliminary version of this paper appeared in Proceedings of the Seventh ACM Conference on
Computer and Communications Security (CCS), November 2000.
Abstract: We consider scalable certificate revocation in a public-key infrastructure (PKI). We introduce depender graphs, a new class of graphs that support efficient and fault-tolerant revocation. Nodes of a depender graph are participants that agree to forward revocation information to other participants. Our depender graphs are k-redundant, so that revocations are provably guaranteed to be received by all non-failed participants even if up to k−1 participants have failed. We present a protocol for constructing k-redundant depender graphs that has two desirable properties. First, it is load-balanced, in that no participant need have too many dependers. Second, it is localized, in that it avoids the need for any participant to maintain the global state of the depender graph. We also give a localized protocol for restructuring the graph in the event of permanent failures.
Keywords: Fault tolerance, public key infrastructures (PKI), revocation
