From Chinese Room to Human Window

Article type: Research Article

Authors: van Emden, Maarten^{a; 1} | Vellino, André^{b; 2}

Affiliations: [a] Victoria, Ottawa | [b] Ottawa, Canada

Note: [1] (Corresponding Author) Department of Computer Science, University of Victoria, Victoria, Canada. [email protected]

Note: [2] André Vellino, School of Information Studies, University of Ottawa, Ottawa, Canada. [email protected]

Abstract: The debate in philosophy and cognitive science about the Chinese Room Argument has focused on whether it is clear that machines can have minds. We present a quantitative argument which shows that Searle’s thought experiment is not relevant to Turing’s Test for intelligence. Instead, we consider a narrower form of Turing’s Test, one that is restricted to the playing of a chess endgame, in which the equivalent of Searle’s argument does apply. An analysis of time/space trade-offs in the playing of chess endgames shows that Michie’s concept of Human Window offers a hint of what a machine’s mental representations might need to be like to be considered equivalent to human cognition.

DOI: 10.3233/ICG-2010-33302

Journal: ICGA Journal, vol. 33, no. 3, pp. 127-139, 2010