Affiliations: Neural Networks Research Centre, Helsinki University
of Technology, P.O. Box 5400, FI-02015 HUT, Finland. Tel.: +358 9 451 5024;
Fax: +358 9 451 3277; E-mail: [email protected]
Abstract: A novel model for asymmetric multiagent reinforcement learning is
introduced in this paper. The model addresses the problem where the information
states of the agents involved in the learning task are not equal; some agents
(leaders) have information how their opponents (followers) will select their
actions and based on this information leaders encourage followers to select
actions that lead to improved payoffs for the leaders. This kind of
configuration arises e.g. in semi-centralized multiagent systems with an
external global utility associated to the system. We present a brief literature
survey of multiagent reinforcement learning based on Markov games and then
propose an asymmetric learning model that utilizes the theory of Markov games.
Additionally, we construct a practical learning method based on the proposed
learning model and study its convergence properties. Finally, we test our model
with a simple example problem and a larger two-layer pricing application.