Note: [] Lee J. Alston, Professor of Economics and Environmental Studies, Department of Economics and Institute of Behavioral Science, University of Colorado at Boulder, and the NBER, <[email protected]>; Krister Andersson, Associate Professor of Environmental Policy, University of Colorado at Boulder, <[email protected]>. We thank A. Agrawal, E. Alston, R. Jessor, G. Libecap, T. McCabe, B. Mueller, E. Mwangi, M. Oppenheimer, E. Ostrom, J. Poterba, A. Ravikumar, B. Weingast, and O. Williamson for discussions and constructive criticism on earlier drafts. Funding for the research was provided by the Institute of Behavioral Science at the University of Colorado, Boulder, and the National Science Foundation (HSD-0527138; SEB-0648447; and SEB- 0528146).
Abstract: Understanding and minimizing the transaction costs of policy implementation are critical for reducing tropical forest losses. As the international community launches REDD, a global initiative to reduce greenhouse gas emissions from tropical deforestation, policymakers need to pay attention to the transactions costs associated with negotiating, monitoring and enforcing contracts between forest users, governments, and donors. The existing institutional design for REDD relies heavily on central government interventions in program countries. Analysing new data on forest conservation outcomes, we identify several problems with this centralized approach to forest protection. We describe options for a more diversified policy approach that could reduce the full set of transaction costs and thereby improve the efficiency of the market-based approach to conservation.
DOI: 10.3233/CL-2011-037
Journal: Climate Law, vol. 2, no. 2, pp. 281-289, 2011
